The National Security Strategies (NSS) of the Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump administrations pledged to defend the nation’s security and interests. However, none of these documents itemize the latter. As for president Biden, he has reportedly recently approved a highly classified nuclear strategy that deals squarely with China’s rising economic and military prowess.

In 1996, the year after Bill Clinton’s NSS was published, the Commission on America’s National Interests (part of the Office of Justice Programs, itself under the U.S. Department of Justice) determined that four levels of US national interests exist: vital, extremely important, just important, and less important. In addition, it concluded that there are only five vital national interests:

1. To prevent the threat of an attack of weapons of mass destruction on U.S. soil or its military abroad;
2. To ensure U.S. allies’ survival and cooperation to shape an international system in which we can thrive;
3. To prevent the emergence of hostile powers on U.S. borders;
4. To ensure the viability of major global systems;
5. And to establish productive relations with nations that could become adversaries.

ONE AND TWO. But given the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles, nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed submarines, and strategic bombers presently deployed by the U.S. and its adversaries, mirror launch on warning policies, the fact that launched ballistic missiles cannot be recalled, redirected or shot down (Russia and the U.S. have in excess of 1600 warheads, the U.S. has 44 interceptors with a 50% kill ratio), the threat of a surprise attack with weapons of mass destruction is ensconced in daily life and cannot be prevented. Instead, the U.S. and Russia, who collectively have the lion’s share of these weapons, rely on deterrence to do so. Should that fail, the subsequent all-out nuclear exchange would annihilate upwards of 600 million people in as little as ninety-two (92) minutes, unleash nuclear winter, and starve to death a further 5 billion around the world in a matter of weeks.

THREE. The emergence of hostile powers on U.S. borders is, for the foreseeable future, not a factor. Indeed, neither Canada, Mexico, nor Latin America as a whole have the means to threaten the U.S.

FOUR. The viability of major global systems presumes that the U.S. will continue to retain its economic and military hegemony. However, the “no limits cooperation” between China and Russia, the refusal of the Global South to sanction Russia on account of the Ukrainian war, and the concerted effort by BRICS countries to collectively avoid the dollar in international transactions suggest that America’s influence and authority is eroding.

FIVE. While it is possible to establish productive relations with Russia, China, Iran, North Korea and others, that would require dialogue and cooperation without preconditions, not confrontation. However, given that as of this writing (August 23, 2024) it’s been over two years since the presidents of the U.S. and Russia have talked to each other, that does not presently appear to be on the table. As for the specific “national interests” that the U.S. is committed to defend, survival should be at the very top. Based on that simple criterion, everything else must necessarily be negotiable, including the status of Israel/Palestine, Russia/Ukraine, China/Taiwan, NATO, the dollar, and control of the world’s oil and natural gas reserves. If we’re unable to reach an agreement, we may not make it to the next century.