Australia’s Great Barrier Reef At Greater Risk Than Previously Believed

February 23, 2016

According to an article published in Nature Communications, the prognosis for Australia’s Great Barrier Reef is in much worse than previously thought.

Excerpt

“The Great Barrier Reef (GBR) is founded on reef-building corals. Corals build their exoskeleton with aragonite, but ocean acidification is lowering the aragonite saturation state of seawater (Ωa). The downscaling of ocean acidification projections from global to GBR scales requires the set of regional drivers controlling Ωa to be resolved. Here we use a regional coupled circulation–biogeochemical model and observations to estimate the Ωa experienced by the 3,581 reefs of the GBR, and to apportion the contributions of the hydrological cycle, regional hydrodynamics and metabolism on Ωa variability. We find more detail, and a greater range (1.43), than previously compiled coarse maps of Ωa of the region (0.4), or in observations (1.0). Most of the variability in Ωa is due to processes upstream of the reef in question. As a result, future decline in Ωa is likely to be steeper on the GBR than currently projected by the IPCC assessment report.”

Water Crisis

06/05/2021

Lake Powell, half full 2014

Drought at Lake Powell

A comprehensive research article published in Science Advances found that water scarcity is actually worse than first thought. The authors found that fully two-thirds of the global population suffer severe water scarcity at least 1 month per year, and nearly half of them live in India and China. In addition, five hundred million people in the world face severe shortages the year round. Their recommendations: cap water consumption by river basin, increase water-use efficiency, and better share the limited freshwater resources.

However well-intended, their suggestions are just a palliative. What is really needed is a vast new source of freshwater. Barring cataclysmic events such as nuclear war, which cannot be discarded, our species needs to have 2.3 children per woman just to survive. Since it’s not possible to have one third of a child, they’ll have to have a minimum of three, and the population will grow. And that growth will spur a higher demand for mates of both sexes and even more water to satisfy their many needs. It’s not that there’s not enough water on our planet; it’s just that despite our otherwise awesome technological achievements in other aspects of human living (and killing) we still basically collect water the same way ancient civilizations did thousands of years ago. Perhaps one reason for this anomaly is the fact that with a few exceptions, most centers of wealth and power have abundant supplies of water at their disposal. For example, it is difficult to imagine how an occupant of the White House, facing the Potomac and periodic ice storms, would include among his/her most pressing priorities finding ways to improve the city’s water supply. It would be contrary to human nature. Conversely, if they lived in Los Angeles, Phoenix or Las Vegas, undoubtedly their attitude toward water would be vastly different.

Make no mistake, the water crisis is as real as, and will be exacerbated by, global warming. And it is the responsibility of leaders worldwide, regardless of how much water there may be in their immediate vicinity, to solve the problem before it spills over into the realm of war and famine. For example, look no further than Syria, where a devastating drought is said to have sparked the ongoing civil war and its consequences.

We need to manufacture our own water far from any shore to make deserts green with oxygen-producing crops to recycle the carbon dioxide already in the atmosphere, and the only way to do so is to produce hydrogen in vast amounts from electrolysis of seawater using solar as the primary source of energy. The technology exists; the principle was vividly illustrated in the movie The Martian, and it is further explained here. The missing ingredient is an enlightened, charismatic leader with the ability to rally even the most ardent skeptics before it’s too late.

Resetting U.S.-Russian Relations

February 4, 2016

Henry Kissinger’s speech (original link to https://gorbachovfund.ru is broken) at the Gorbachev Fund in Moscow

From 2007 into 2009, Evgeny Primakov and I chaired a group composed of retired senior ministers, high officials, and military leaders from Russia and the United States, including some of you present here today. Its purpose was to ease the adversarial aspects of the U.S.-Russian relationship and to consider opportunities for cooperative approaches. In America, it was described as a Track II group, which meant it was bipartisan and encouraged by the White House to explore but not negotiate on its behalf. We alternated meetings in each other’s country. President Putin received the group in Moscow in 2007, and President Medvedev in 2009. In 2008, President George W. Bush assembled most of his National Security team in the Cabinet Room for a dialogue with our guests.

All the participants had held responsible positions during the Cold War. During periods of tension, they had asserted the national interest of their country as they understood it. But they had also learned through experience the perils of a technology threatening civilized life and evolving in a direction which, in crisis, might disrupt any organized human activity. Upheavals were looming around the globe, magnified in part by different cultural identities and clashing ideologies. The goal of the Track II effort was to overcome crises and explore common principles of world order.

Evgeny Primakov was an indispensable partner in this effort. His sharp analytical mind combined with a wide grasp of global trends acquired in years close to and ultimately at the center of power, and his great devotion to his country refined our thinking and helped in the quest for a common vision. We did not always agree, but we always respected each other. He is missed by all of us and by me personally as a colleague and a friend.

I do not need to tell you that our relations today are much worse than they were a decade ago. Indeed, they are probably the worst they have been since before the end of the Cold War. Mutual trust has been dissipated on both sides. Confrontation has replaced cooperation. I know that in his last months, Evgeny Primakov looked for ways to overcome this disturbing state of affairs. We would honor his memory by making that effort our own.

At the end of the Cold War, both Russians and Americans had a vision of strategic partnership shaped by their recent experiences. Americans were expecting that a period of reduced tensions would lead to productive cooperation on global issues. Russian pride in their role in modernizing their society was tempered by discomfort at the transformation of their borders and recognition of the monumental tasks ahead in reconstruction and redefinition. Many on both sides understood that the fates of Russia and the U.S. remained tightly intertwined. Maintaining strategic stability and preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction became a growing necessity, as did the building of a security system for Eurasia, especially along Russia’s long periphery. New vistas opened up in trade and investment; cooperation in the field of energy topped the list.

Regrettably, the momentum of global upheaval has outstripped the capacities of statesmanship. Evgeny Primakov’s decision as Prime Minister, on a flight over the Atlantic to Washington, to order his plane to turn around and return to Moscow to protest the start of NATO military operations in Yugoslavia was symbolic. The initial hopes that the close cooperation in the early phases of the campaign against al-Qaida and the Taliban in Afghanistan might lead to partnership on a broader range of issues weakened in the vortex of disputes over Middle East policy, and then collapsed with the Russian military moves in the Caucasus in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014. The more recent efforts to find common ground in the Syria conflict and to defuse the tension over Ukraine have done little to change the mounting sense of estrangement.

The prevailing narrative in each country places full blame on the other side, and in each country there is a tendency to demonize, if not the other country, then its leaders. As national security issues dominate the dialogue, some of the mistrust and suspicions from the bitter Cold-War struggle have reemerged. These feelings have been exacerbated in Russia by the memory of the first post-Soviet decade when Russia suffered a staggering socio-economic and political crisis, while the United States enjoyed its longest period of uninterrupted economic expansion. All this caused policy differences over the Balkans, the former Soviet territory, the Middle East, NATO expansion, missile defense, and arms sales to overwhelm prospects for cooperation.

Perhaps most important has been a fundamental gap in historical conception. For the United States, the end of the Cold War seemed like a vindication of its traditional faith in inevitable democratic revolution. It visualized the expansion of an international system governed by essentially legal rules. But Russia’s historical experience is more complicated. To a country across which foreign armies have marched for centuries from both East and West, security will always need to have a geopolitical, as well as a legal, foundation. When its security border moves from the Elbe 1,000 miles east towards Moscow, Russia’s perception of world order will contain an inevitable strategic component. The challenge of our period is to merge the two perspectives—the legal and the geopolitical—in a coherent concept.

In this way, paradoxically, we find ourselves confronting anew an essentially philosophical problem. How does the United States work together with Russia, a country which does not share all its values but is an indispensable component of the international order? How does Russia exercise its security interests without raising alarms around its periphery and accumulating adversaries? Can Russia gain a respected place in global affairs with which the United States is comfortable? Can the United States pursue its values without being perceived as threatening to impose them? I will not attempt to propose answers to all these questions. My purpose is to encourage an effort to explore them.

Many commentators, both Russian and American, have rejected the possibility of the U.S. and Russia working cooperatively on a new international order. In their view, the United States and Russia have entered a new Cold War.

The danger today is less a return to military confrontation than the consolidation of a self-fulfilling prophecy in both countries. The long-term interests of both countries call for a world that transforms the contemporary turbulence and flux into a new equilibrium which is increasingly multipolar and globalized.

The nature of the turmoil is in itself unprecedented. Until quite recently, global international threats were identified with the accumulation of power by a dominating state. Today threats more frequently arise from the disintegration of state power and the growing number of ungoverned territories. This spreading power vacuum cannot be dealt with by any state, no matter how powerful on an exclusively national basis. It requires sustained cooperation between the United States and Russia, and other major powers. Therefore the elements of competition, in dealing with the traditional conflicts in the interstate system, must be constrained so that the competition remains within bounds and creates conditions which prevent a recurrence.

There are, as we know, a number of divisive issues before us, Ukraine or Syria as the most immediate. For the past few years, our countries have engaged in episodic discussions of such matters without much notable progress. This is not surprising, because the discussions have taken place outside an agreed strategic framework. Each of the specific issues is an expression of a larger strategic one. Ukraine needs to be embedded in the structure of European and international security architecture in such a way that it serves as a bridge between Russia and the West, rather than as an outpost of either side. Regarding Syria, it is clear that the local and regional factions cannot find a solution on their own. Compatible U.S.-Russian efforts coordinated with other major powers could create a pattern for peaceful solutions in the Middle East and perhaps elsewhere.

Any effort to improve relations must include a dialogue about the emerging world order. What are the trends that are eroding the old order and shaping the new one? What challenges do the changes pose to both Russian and American national interests? What role does each country want to play in shaping that order, and what position can it reasonably and ultimately hope to occupy in that new order? How do we reconcile the very different concepts of world order that have evolved in Russia and the United States—and in other major powers—on the basis of historical experience? The goal should be to develop a strategic concept for U.S.-Russian relations within which the points of contention may be managed.

In the 1960’s and 1970’s, I perceived international relations as an essentially adversarial relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. With the evolution of technology, a conception of strategic stability developed that the two countries could implement, even as their rivalry continued in other areas. The world has changed dramatically since then. In particular, in the emerging multipolar order, Russia should be perceived as an essential element of any new global equilibrium, not primarily as a threat to the United States.

I have spent the greater part of the past seventy years engaged in one way or another in U.S.-Russian relations. I have been at decision centers when alert levels have been raised, and at joint celebrations of diplomatic achievement. Our countries and the peoples of the world need a more durable prospect.

I am here to argue for the possibility of a dialogue that seeks to merge our futures rather than elaborate our conflicts. This requires respect by both sides of the vital values and interest of the other. These goals cannot be completed in what remains of the current administration. But neither should their pursuits be postponed for American domestic politics. It will only come with a willingness in both Washington and Moscow, in the White House and the Kremlin, to move beyond the grievances and sense of victimization to confront the larger challenges that face both of our countries in the years ahead.

Job Losses Up 218% in January 2016

February 4, 2016

Challenger, Gray and Christmas, an outplacement firm, released its job cuts report for January. Layoffs increased by 218%, the highest since last summer, mostly due to a loss of 16,000 jobs at Wal-Mart, America’s biggest non-government employer, and 4,800 at Macy’s. The low-wage retail sector suffered cuts of 22,246, the highest total since 2009. The energy sector shed 20,103 jobs, mostly from Halliburton, Baker Hughes, and Schlumberger, the nation’s largest oilfield services firms.

Fiscal Year 2017 Defense Department’s Budget Request

February 2, 2016

Secretary of Defense Ashton B. Carter revealed the 2017 fiscal year budget request. Essentially it is a continuation of former Secretary Chuck Hagel’s view that the path forward for the U.S. is an open-ended arms race to safeguard the nation’s interests, even if they perpetuate our addiction to fossil fuels, particularly oil. It is a path of confrontation with Russia and China and the eventual annihilation of the human race.

Left unsaid is how much the budget will add to the national debt; it also assumes that the American economy will be able to afford such expenditures given the wholesale destruction of the middle class and the 47 million poor people who, through no fault of their own, do not have the income to contribute to the Treasury as much as they once did.

Following is an excerpt of the Secretary’s speech at the Economic Club of Washington, D.C.

“In this budget we’re taking the long view,” the secretary said. “We have to. Even as we fight today’s fights, we must also be prepared for the fights that might come 10, 20 or 30 years down the road.”

Five evolving challenges drive the department’s planning, he said, including Russian aggression in Europe, the rise of China in the Asia Pacific, North Korea, Iran, and the ongoing fight against terrorism, especially the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.
Five Challenges

The department must and will address all five challenges and across all domains, Carter said.

“Not just the usual air, land and sea, but also particularly in the areas of cyber, space and electronic warfare, where our reliance on technology has given us great strengths but also led to vulnerabilities that adversaries are eager to exploit,” he added.

Highlighting new investments in the budget to deal with the accelerated military campaign against ISIL, Carter said the department is requesting $7.5 billion, 50 percent more than in 2016.

Of that, he said $1.8 billion will go to buy more than 45,000 GPS-guided smart bombs and laser-guided rockets. The budget request also defers the A-10 final retirement until 2022, replacing it with F-35 Joint Strike Fighters squadron by squadron.

Strategic Capabilities
To support the European Reassurance Initiative, the Pentagon is requesting $3.4 billion in 2017, quadrupling the fiscal 2016 amount, the secretary said, to fund more rotational U.S. forces in Europe, more training and exercising with allies, and more prepositioned fighting gear and supporting infrastructure.

Investments in new technologies include projects being developed by the DoD Strategic Capabilities Office, which Carter created in 2012 when he was deputy defense secretary, “to reimagine existing DoD, intelligence community and commercial systems by giving them new roles and game-changing capabilities,” he said.

To drive such innovation forward, the 2017 budget request for research and development accounts is $71.4 billion.

Carter said SCO efforts include projects involving advanced navigation, swarming autonomous vehicles for use in different ways and domains, self-driving networked boats, gun-based missile defense, and an arsenal plane that turns one of the department’s older planes into a flying launch pad for a range of conventional payloads.”

Doomsday Clock 2021

June 5, 2021

 

Click to enlarge

Click to enlarge

 

It is now 100 seconds to midnight, the closest it’s ever been to civilization-ending apocalypse. Read the entire statement here.

Editor’s note: Founded in 1945 by Albert Einstein and University of Chicago scientists who helped develop the first atomic weapons in the Manhattan Project, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists created the Doomsday Clock two years later, using the imagery of apocalypse (midnight) and the contemporary idiom of nuclear explosion (countdown to zero) to convey threats to humanity and the planet. The Doomsday Clock is set every year by the Bulletin’s Science and Security Board in consultation with its Board of Sponsors, which includes 13 Nobel laureates. The Clock has become a universally recognized indicator of the world’s vulnerability to catastrophe from nuclear weapons, climate change, and disruptive technologies in other domains.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

President Reagan Quotes on Disarmament

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/CPwJ78oW8AAr46e.jpg“I can’t believe that this world can go on beyond our generation and on down to succeeding generations with this kind of weapon on both sides poised at each other without someday some fool or some maniac or some accident triggering the kind of war that is the end of the line for all of us. And I just think of what a sigh of relief would go up from everyone on this earth if someday–and this is what I have–my hope, way in the back of my head–is that if we start down the road to reduction, maybe one day in doing that, somebody will say, ‘Why not all the way? Let’s get rid of all these things’.”
Ronald Reagan, May 16, 1983

 

“A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. The only value in our two nations possessing nuclear weapons is to make sure they will never be used. But then would it not be better to do away with them entirely?”
Ronald Reagan, 1984 State of the Union

 

“We seek the total elimination one day of nuclear weapons from the face of the Earth.”
Ronald Reagan, Inaugural Address, 1985

 

“It is my fervent goal and hope…that we will some day no longer have to rely on nuclear weapons to deter aggression and assure world peace. To that end the United States is now engaged in a serious and sustained effort to negotiate major reductions in levels of offensive nuclear weapons with the ultimate goal of eliminating these weapons from the face of the earth.”
Ronald Reagan, October 20, 1986

 

“My central arms control objective has been to reduce substantially, and ultimately to eliminate, nuclear weapons and rid the world of the nuclear threat. The prevention of the spread of nuclear explosives to additional countries is an indispensable part of our efforts to meet this objective. I intend to continue my pursuit of this goal with untiring determination and a profound sense of personal commitment.”
Ronald Reagan, March 25, 1988 Message to Congress on NPT

President Kennedy on Disarmament

Address to the U.N. General Assembly, September 25, 1961

J Kennedy & Kruschev …“Today, every inhabitant of this planet must contemplate the day when this planet may no longer be habitable. Every man, woman and child lives under a nuclear sword of Damocles, hanging by the slenderest of threads, capable of being cut at any moment by accident or miscalculation or by madness. The weapons of war must be abolished before they abolish us.

Men no longer debate whether armaments are a symptom or a cause of tension. The mere existence of modern weapons–ten million times more powerful than any that the world has ever seen, and only minutes away from any target on earth–is a source of horror, and discord and distrust. Men no longer maintain that disarmament must await the settlement of all disputes–for disarmament must be a part of any permanent settlement. And men may no longer pretend that the quest for disarmament is a sign of weakness–for in a spiraling arms race, a nation’s security may well be shrinking even as its arms increase.

For 15 years this organization has sought the reduction and destruction of arms. Now that goal is no longer a dream–it is a practical matter of life or death. The risks inherent in disarmament pale in comparison to the risks inherent in an unlimited arms race”…

 

Excerpt – Commencement Address at American University, June 10, 1963; assassinated November 22, 1963

…”I speak of peace because of the new face of war. Total war makes no sense in an age when great powers can maintain large and relatively invulnerable nuclear forces and refuse to surrender without resort to those forces. It makes no sense in an age when a single nuclear weapon contains almost ten times the explosive force delivered by all the allied air forces in the Second World War. It makes no sense in an age when the deadly poisons produced by a nuclear exchange would be carried by wind and water and soil and seed to the far corners of the globe and to generations yet unborn.

Today the expenditure of billions of dollars every year on weapons acquired for the purpose of making sure we never need to use them is essential to keeping the peace. But surely the acquisition of such idle stockpiles–which can only destroy and never create–is not the only, much less the most efficient, means of assuring peace.

I speak of peace, therefore, as the necessary rational end of rational men. I realize that the pursuit of peace is not as dramatic as the pursuit of war–and frequently the words of the pursuer fall on deaf ears. But we have no more urgent task.

Some say that it is useless to speak of world peace or world law or world disarmament–and that it will be useless until the leaders of the Soviet Union adopt a more enlightened attitude. I hope they do. I believe we can help them do it. But I also believe that we must reexamine our own attitude–as individuals and as a Nation–for our attitude is as essential as theirs…”

Secretaries Shultz, Perry, Kissinger & Senator Nunn on Nonproliteration

Next Steps in Reducing Nuclear Risks: The Pace of Nonproliferation Work Today Doesn’t Match the Urgency of the Threat

March 6, 2013

George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn
Op-eds/Statements

Every American president since the end of World War II has sought to come to grips with the unique security risks and challenges associated with nuclear weapons. The specter of a nuclear war, accident, proliferation or terrorism has led to serious and sustained efforts to control, reduce and eliminate nuclear risks. Over the decades, progress has been made in reducing nuclear weapons, and bringing about international agreements on nonproliferation.

Recently, the four of us have supported two major policy initiatives: the 2010 New Start Treaty with Russia, which verifiably reduced bilateral nuclear stockpiles; and the Nuclear Security Summits of 2010 and 2012, which have energized global efforts to secure nuclear weapons and materials. Both initiatives are significant and hopeful steps that add to a solid foundation of bipartisan accomplishment over many decades. Most notably, the number of nuclear weapons in the world today is less than one-third of the total in 1986 at the time of the Reagan-Gorbachev Reykjavik summit.

Despite these considerable efforts, nuclear dangers remain all too real. Technological progress and the proliferation of nuclear weapons to additional states are compounded by dangerous complacency. Bilateral relations between the two largest nuclear powers, the United States and Russia, are frayed, and there are continuing difficulties in effectively addressing emerging nuclear threats in North Korea and Iran, punctuated recently by a test explosion in North Korea. Combined with the dangers of suicidal terrorist groups, the growing number of nations with nuclear arms and differing motives, aims and ambitions poses very high and unpredictable risks.

It is far from certain that today’s world can successfully replicate the Cold War Soviet-American deterrence by “mutually assured destruction”—the threat of imposing unacceptable damage on the adversary. That was based essentially on a bipolar world. But when a large and growing number of nuclear adversaries confront multiple perceived threats, the relative restraint of the Cold War will be difficult to sustain. The risk that deterrence will fail and that nuclear weapons will be used increases dramatically.

Global leaders owe it to their publics to reduce, and eventually to eliminate, these risks. Even during the Cold War, the leaders of the two superpowers sought to reduce the risk of nuclear war. What was possible among declared enemies is imperative in a world of increasing nuclear stockpiles in some nations, multiple nuclear military powers and growing diffusion of nuclear energy. A global effort is needed to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons, prevent their spread, and ultimately end them as a threat to the world. It will take leadership, creative approaches and thoughtful understanding of the perils of inaction. Near-term results would lay the foundation for transforming global security policies over the medium and long term. We suggest four areas requiring urgent consideration:

1. Securing nuclear materials to prevent catastrophic nuclear terrorism. Materials necessary for building a nuclear bomb today are stored at hundreds of sites in 28 countries—down from over 40 countries just 10 years ago. But many of these sites aren’t well secured, leaving the materials vulnerable to theft or sale on the black market. Important commitments were undertaken to secure nuclear materials and improve cooperation during the 2010 and 2012 Nuclear Security Summits. These could improve security for generations to come. Yet no global system is in place for tracking, accounting for, managing and securing all weapons-usable nuclear materials.

At the next Nuclear Security Summit, planned for 2014 in the Netherlands, world leaders should commit to develop a comprehensive global materials security system—including procedures for international assurances—to ensure that all weapons-usable nuclear materials are secure from unauthorized access and theft.

2. Changes in the deployment patterns of the two largest nuclear powers to increase decision time for leaders. In the 2008 campaign, then-Sen. Obama said: “Keeping nuclear weapons ready to launch on a moment’s notice is a dangerous relic of the Cold War. Such policies increase the risk of catastrophic accidents or miscalculation. I will work with Russia to end such outdated Cold War policies in a mutual and verifiable way.” The U.S. should work with nuclear-armed nations world-wide to remove all nuclear weapons from the prompt-launch status in which nuclear-armed ballistic missiles are deployed to be launched in minutes. To jump-start this initiative, the U.S. and Russia should agree to take a percentage of their nuclear warheads off prompt-launch status—remembering Ronald Reagan’s admonition to “trust but verify.”

3. Actions following New Start. The progress in the strategic field has been considerable. Washington should carefully examine going below New Start levels of warheads and launchers, including the possibility of coordinated mutual actions. Such a course has the following prerequisites:

a) strict reciprocity; b) demonstrable verification; and c) providing adequate and stable funding for the long-term investments required to maintain high confidence in our nuclear arsenal.

Consolidating and reducing U.S. and Russian tactical nuclear weapons not covered under New Start should also be a high priority. It must be recognized that as some other nuclear-armed states are building up their inventories, or if new nuclear powers emerge, U.S. and Russian nuclear reductions face an inherent limit. The nuclear programs of North Korea and Iran undermine the Non-Proliferation Treaty and pose a direct threat to regional and global stability. Unless these two states are brought into compliance with their international obligations, their continued nuclear programs will erode support for nonproliferation and further nuclear reductions.

4. Without verification and transparency, nuclear-security agreements cannot be completed with confidence. The U.S. should launch a “verification initiative” that involves the U.S. nuclear weapons laboratories and global scientific experts in developing essential technologies and innovations for reducing and controlling nuclear weapons and materials. The principle of enhanced transparency could also be applied to missile defense so long as it doesn’t risk capabilities. Taking the lead in fostering greater transparency sets an important base line for all nations and can facilitate future verification of nuclear materials and weapons.

This strategy focused on immediate steps would give leaders greater confidence to take measures to improve security in the near-term. It would boost prospects for support by legislatures. Close consultations with Congress are crucial.

We also need a new dialogue. In our January 2007 op-ed on these pages, we identified practical steps toward the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. These steps will involve many nations, not just those currently in possession of nuclear weapons. Progress will require greater cooperation. The U.S. must work with other key states to establish a joint enterprise with common objectives to achieve near-term results. Russia and the U.S., with the largest nuclear stockpiles, have a special responsibility in this regard.

• A coalition of the willing. The Nuclear Security Summits could provide a model for leaders working together to create a joint enterprise that would generate a coalition of willing states to establish priorities and achieve progress on specific steps. Essential subjects should be identified in which many nations have a stake, and to which many must make a contribution. A timetable for meetings between heads of government would help build a diplomatic structure for engagement, within which foreign ministers, defense ministers and others can work together between the meetings of government leaders.

• Regional dialogues. Such a joint enterprise should include and be reinforced by regional dialogues. Top political, defense and military leaders should explore with their counterparts a range of practical steps on core security issues. The Euro-Atlantic region—an area that includes Europe, Russia and the U.S., four nuclear weapon states and over 90% of global nuclear inventories—will need to play a central role. China and other key states will need to be engaged both on multilateral issues and within their own regions.

The continuing risk posed by nuclear weapons remains an overarching strategic problem, but the pace of work doesn’t now match the urgency of the threat. The consequences of inaction are potentially catastrophic, and we must continue to ask: How will citizens react to the chaos and suffering of a nuclear attack? Won’t they demand to know what could have been done to prevent this? Our age has stolen fire from the gods. Can we confine this awesome power to peaceful purposes before it consumes us?

Mr. Shultz was secretary of state from 1982-89. Mr. Perry was secretary of defense from 1994-97. Mr. Kissinger was secretary of state from 1973-77. Mr. Nunn is a former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and chief executive officer of the Nuclear Threat Initiative. All are distinguished fellows or visiting distinguished fellows at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution.

 

Latin America on Disarmament

Statement
Latin American and Caribbean Leadership Network for Nuclear
Disarmament and Nonproliferation

On the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Test-ban Treaty

March 2015

Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10 September 1996, the Comprehensive Test-ban Treaty did not yet enter into force. Eight States – the United States of America, Egypt, Israel, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Pakistan, India, China and the DPRK (North Korea) – still need to ratify the Treaty for it to become formally part of the body of international law. Although the countries that possess nuclear arsenals, with the exception of North Korea, have been observing unilateral, voluntary moratoria on nuclear weapon tests for several years now, the entry into force of the instrument is a longstanding goal of the international community and would constitute a major achievement in promoting nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.
Several General Assembly resolutions have repeatedly urged those eight remaining States to ratify the Treaty forthwith. Once in force, the CTBT would become a legally binding commitment to prevent the development of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear weapon States and of new types of nuclear weapons by States that already possess them.
The fact that no tests have been conducted by all but one State over the past years is no reason for complacency. The entry into force of the Treaty would place on a firm legal basis a well-developed system of verification and control to ensure compliance with its provisions. To allow the Treaty to remain without legally binding force is a risk that may come to be regretted. Each of the eight States whose ratification is necessary takes a great responsibility by not ratifying.
The successful conclusion of the CTBT after a series of negotiations over a couple of decades and its signature by an overwhelming majority of States is ample evidence of the political commitment by the international community to bring it into force. Ratification will be seen as honoring that commitment and would demonstrate that governments and civil society have not abandoned efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament and prevent further proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Released on March 18, 2015

[Signed]
Sergio Abreu, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and former Senator of Uruguay.
Irma Argüello, President of the NPSGlobal Foundation – Secretary of the LALN, Argentina.
Álvaro Bermúdez, former Director of Energy and Nuclear Technology of Uruguay.
Sérgio de Queiroz Duarte, former United Nations Under Secretary for Disarmament Affairs and member of the Brazil’s diplomatic service.
Sergio González Gálvez, former Deputy Secretary of External Relations and member of the Mexico’s diplomatic service.
Oswaldo Jarrin, former Minister of Defense of Ecuador.
José Horacio Jaunarena, former Minister of Defense of Argentina.
Ricardo López Murphy, former Minister of Defense of Argentina.
Miguel Marín Bosch, former Alternate Permanent Representative to the United Nations and member of the Mexico’s diplomatic service.
José Pampuro, former Minister of Defense of Argentina.
Jaime Ravinet de la Fuente, former Minister of Defense of Chile.
Camilo Reyes Rodríguez, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Colombia.
Ronaldo Mota Sardenberg, former Minister of Science and Technology and member of the Brazil’s diplomatic service.
Noel Sinclair, Permanent Observer of the Caribbean Community – CARICOM to the United Nations and member of the Guyana’s diplomatic service.
Gioconda Ubeda, former Vice Chancellor of Costa Rica and former Secretary General of OPANAL

WordPress theme: Kippis 1.15
Translate »